China Forestry Holdings 0930.HK

IPO'd 14 months ago, suspended and needs a good forest fire to flush out the shysters.

Following the tried and tested IPO flip.. boost the numbers with extraordinary income (property revaluations), IPO the stock to suckers and cash out.

In the offering document, the company claimed that it made net profits of 339 million yuan (HK$400 million) in 2006, 783 million yuan in 2007 and 5.8 billion yuan in 2008,

If it seems too good... it stinks. You can have all this and less on the HKEX. Brought to you this time by UBS and Cazenove.

First Natural 1076.hk: the fraud continues

Liquidators still cannot recover property from the former thieving directors. There has been fraud committed, the courts in some regions recognize that fraud has been committed, however there is no property rights and property in plain sight cannot be recovered. The liquidators cannot even get a hearing in Ningbo. What is the bunch of useless cocksuckers in the SFC/HKex doing?

"Since the appointment on 6 January 2009, Mr. Stephen Liu Yiu Keung and Mr. David Yen Ching Wai, the

Provisional Liquidators, have been investigating into the affairs of the Group and have taken all necessary
actions to preserve the assets and to assess the situation of the subsidiaries of the Company in the People’s
Republic of China (the “PRC”). However, without the assistance of the former Directors, Mr. Yeung and Mr.
Yang, who were the legal representatives of the subsidiaries in the PRC, the Provisional Liquidators would
not be able to proceed the same. As such, legal actions have been taken against Mr. Yeung and Mr. Yang in
respective regions in the PRC for the possible damages to the Group resulting from their illegal possessions
of the properties of the subsidiaries in the PRC, including but not limited to, the company chops and statutory
certificates of the subsidiaries in the PRC. The status of the court cases as at the date of this report is as follows:
(i) Fuqing Longyu Food Development Co., Limited (“Fuqing Longyu”)
The Provisional Liquidators were informed by the PRC legal adviser, based on his recent visit to the
Administration of Industry and Commerce in Fuqing (福清市工商行政管理局) (the “Fuqing AIC”) in May
2010 and to the Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation Bureau in Fuqing (福清市對外貿易經濟合作
局) (“Fuqing FTECB”) in July 2010, that the changes of the board and the legal representative of Fuqing
Longyu have not been effected despite the enforcement notices having been issued to both authorities
by the Fuzhou Intermediate People’s Court (福州市中級人民法院) of Fujian Province, the PRC.
As such, the Provisional Liquidators have written to the Fujian Provincial Department of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation (the “Fujian FTECB”) (福建省對外貿易經濟合作廳), the Hong Kong Economic
and Trade Office in Guangdong of the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (the
“HKETO”) (香港特別行政區政府駐粵經濟貿易辦事處) and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC (中華人
民共和國商務部) informing the difficulties encountered and seeking their assistance in replacing the board
and the legal representative of Fuqing Longyu and are awaiting their replies.
The Provisional Liquidators were informed by the Fujian Branch of Bank of China (“BOC Fujian”)(中國
銀行－福建省分行) in the PRC that the BOC Fujian had obtained a judgment against Fuqing Longyu in
relation to a loan granted to Fuqing Longyu and is taking steps to dispose of certain collaterals to repay
the loan. Since the replacement of the board and the legal representative of Fuqing Longyu has not been
effected by Fuqing AIC, the BOC Fujian has not provided the Provisional Liquidators with the details of the
abovementioned legal action.
(ii) Jia Jing Commercial (Shanghai) Co., Limited (“Jia Jing (Shanghai)”)
After consulting the PRC legal advisers, the Provisional Liquidators are taking appropriate steps to apply
for re-issuance of company chops and statutory certificates of Jia Jing (Shanghai).
(iii) Ningbo Dingwei Food Development Co., Limited (“Ningbo Dingwei”)
First China Technology Limited, a subsidiary of the Company and the immediate holding company of
Ningbo Dingwei, attempted to file a statement of claim with the Ningbo Intermediate People’s Court
of Zhejiang Province (the “Ningbo Court”) (浙江省寧波市中級人民法院) but the filing was denied by the
Ningbo Court. The Provisional Liquidators have been collating further evidence and are taking appropriate
steps to prepare a revised statement of claim to be filed with the Ningbo Court.

Jack Flader

Chaoda 0682 love granting options to themselves

but the shareholders don't..

resolution 5(B) "To grant a general mandate to the board of directors to allot, issue and deal with shares of the Company"

passes by a narrow 1.5% margin. Only a matter of time before this house of card collapses.

Rino

by Muddy Waters saying essentially it's a piece of shit:

Auditor: Frazer Frost (formerly Moore, Stephens Wurth Frazer and Torbet)

• RINO’s FGD sales (60% to 75% of revenue) are much lower than it claims. We found that many of its customer relationships do not exist.
• Chinese regulatory filings show that RINO’s consolidated 2009 revenue was only $11 million, or 94.2% lower than it reported in the US. We show that the Chinese numbers are credible.
• RINO’s accounting has serious flaws that are clear signs of cooked books.
• RINO’s management is draining cash from the company for its own business and personal uses. The management is in flagrant breach of its VIE agreements, which require it to pay income to RINO (as opposed to taking it).
• RINO’s balance sheet has an astonishingly small amount of tangible assets for a manufacturer. Rather, it is filled with low quality “paper” assets that balance out the inflated earnings, and likely hide leakage.
• RINO is not the industry leader it claims to be in the steel sinter FGD system market. Rather, it is an obscure company in a crowded field, and is best known for its failed projects. Its reported margins are two to three times what they really are. Its technology is sub-par.
• We are not sanguine about management “borrowing” $3.2 million to purchase a luxury home in Orange County, CA the day that RINO closed its $100.0 million financing.

Art Textile 0565.hk

This company is listed on the HKEX and primary produces textiles. It attempts to be less affected by the vagarities of commodification by moving to highend textiles. Most of it's products are sold in China. Constant mention is made in it's annual reports about attending textile fairs in Paris but no results of these attendances are forthcoming.

This company showed up in my earlier screens with high cash and a low price/book ratio. The key points were: was the cash really there and how shareholder friendly would the management be in utilizing this cash.

Auditor: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

2007 Annual Report:

Cash: HKD$487m

All Debt: $10m

Inventories: $25m

Receivables: $62m (Rev: $645m)

2008: Announces deal to purchase factory/land from "third" parties for HKD$174m. The vendor was conveniently established in 14 August 2006.

2010 Annual Report:

Cash: $480m

Debt: $393m

Inventories: $104m

Rev: $801

Receivables: $230m

In the 3 years of this period, management has purchased properties/equipment from a third party. Revenue has doubled, however inventories and receivables have quadrupled resulting in negative cashflow for the last 2 years.

I am leery of the timing and fit of the purchases made in 2007 as well as the ballooning receivables which I believe are destined to go bad ($20m > 90days overdue).

On the scale of stinkiness this Chinese company rates a putrid.

ChiNext short candidate

End of lockup period plus...

"As of yesterday, 134 companies listed on ChiNext were traded at an average 72.4 times their 2009 earnings, compared to a price-earnings ratio of 38 on the Shenzhen exchange's main board."